Path: rwcrnsc51.ops.asp.att.net!attbi_slave51!attbi_master52!attbi_feed3!attbi.com!204.127.161.1!wn1feed!worldnet.att.net!204.71.34.3!newsfeed.cwix.com!feed2.news.rcn.net!rcn!newsfeed1.earthlink.net!newsfeed.earthlink.net!newsmaster1.prod.itd.earthlink.net!newsread2.prod.itd.earthlink.net.POSTED!not-for-mail From: enigl@aol.com (Davin C. Enigl) Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc Subject: Re: Ten Remarks on the Nature of Consciousness Message-ID: <3c855dde.8622691@news.earthlink.net> References: <3C814A71.FEE5A79C@me.com> <3C87682C.5030005@cern.ch> <3C88EA0C.7050602@cern.ch> <_W8i8.8443$A%3.68335@ord-read.news.verio.net> <3C8C65A6.4060409@cern.ch> X-Newsreader: Forte Free Agent 1.21/32.243 Lines: 122 Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2002 19:23:08 GMT NNTP-Posting-Host: 216.224.166.214 X-Complaints-To: abuse@earthlink.net X-Trace: newsread2.prod.itd.earthlink.net 1015874588 216.224.166.214 (Mon, 11 Mar 2002 11:23:08 PST) NNTP-Posting-Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2002 11:23:08 PST Organization: EarthLink Inc. -- http://www.EarthLink.net Xref: attbi_master52 talk.philosophy.misc:1573 X-Received-Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2002 19:23:09 GMT (rwcrnsc51.ops.asp.att.net) On Mon, 11 Mar 2002 09:07:02 +0100, Julian LEWIS wrote: >Hewpiedawg wrote: > >> "Julian LEWIS" wrote in message >> news:3C88EA0C.7050602@cern.ch... >> >>>Hewpiedawg wrote: >>> >>>>This principle is itself a proposition >>>>and, therefore, can be applied to itself. This is a variation of the "self-referent criticism" -- an argument I see often applied to the logic of logic epistemological systems. Unfortunately, I think the "self-referent criticism" invalidates itself for the same reason it was proposed which leade to an infinite regress. Therefore, the "self-referent criticism" cannot be an important criticism (see Popper's (1934/1959) or Bartley in Radnitzky and Bartley's (1987) or Miller's (1994) for why this might be so). For instance, a counter example is that there are logical systems that have self-referent logic, yet also have symmetry-breaking in its logical transmissibility - e.g., critical rationalism, critical empiricism, pan critical rationalism, Ackermann's (1989) New Experimentalism, and Chalmer's Sophisticated Falsificationism (1976/1982/1999). Unfortunately, the Verification Principle does have a logical transmissibility problem -- namely: 1. Popper's criticism of the Problem of Induction. Plus, Popper's infinite regress of meaning vs. the non-infinite regress of understanding. 2. Bartley's essay on Rationality Versus the Theory of Rationality. Cf. Bunge's (1966/1999 edition). Other criticisms of the Verification Principle are found in: 3. Frege's unified semantic theory of meaning reference and application. 4. Quine's "whole theory" reference of meaning to a link with experience. 5. And of course, the self-referent criticism -- as already posted in this thread. Anyway, I will stop here. For a quick review of the downfall of Logical Positivism's Verification Principle, see The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, p. 541-2. But, the VP's idea is still a good one because common sense says you should bs able to provide an empirically observable connection between an abstract explanatory theory and the physical non-abstract world. A. J. Ayer's thinking in his _Language, Truth and Logic_ is still required reading in every philosophy of science course that I know of. >>>What is the difference between a proposition and a definition ? >>> >>>The verification principle is NOT a proposition, it is a definition >>>of meaning. And, therefore is it analytic, rather than synthetic. The VP is also a true epistemological method -- however its worth as an epistemological method is if it results in reliable knowledge or not. Here, it fails, because it goes too far. The original intent was to eliminate metaphysics from meaningful discourse and argument and to thereby impose a simple physical-only metaphysics -- an empirical-only reality. However, this attempt failed. >> It is not a useful one, then. By this definition, every >> Axiom is meaningless. No, this a straw-man argument. If you read A. J. Ayer's book op. cit. p. 9-10, you will find the differences between the strong and weak verification senses of the term "verifiable" and hence on p. 15-16 what is meant by meaningless. It is too bad that more people don't read Ayer's book first -- it would make the quality of arguments much higher and deeper. >An axiom is not a proposition, so the verification principle says >nothing about their meaning. Axioms are always TRUE by definition. Correct. However, the axioms (of the method) may be criticized while criticizing the method -- first they must pass global or local logical consistency requirements, second, are they meeting or not meeting the aim of the method compared to an alternate method? >By >the way if you know of a better theory of meaning, then I would like to >hear it. I think Popper's Theory of Understanding is better. Read his criticism of meaning in Realism and the Aim of Science ((1956/1983 edition), p. 179-193 and the following chapter: "Metaphysics: Sense or Nonsense?", p. 194-216. Also, read about the distinction between dictionary meanings and ostensive meanings -- which is also superior, IMO. But there are several others (not all IMO better ones) too: Quine (IMO, not better), Peirce (IMO, better), James (IMO, might be better, I am unsure), Frege (IMO, not better) . . . > The only other theory i know is the denotation theory... >A proposition means what it denotes. This is one of the "referential" theories of meaning that misses the "application" of meaning to experience. >Bertrand Russell is much smarter than me, so I guess I >missed the point. >Julian Russell said he should have written Ayer's (1936) book himself. This, perhaps despite Russell's knowledge of Popper's (1934) criticisms of Logical Positivism? It is hard for me to tell for sure. ------------------- >Julian Lewis >PS/CO CERN >Telephone Geneva 7673931 >